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Dear Richard,
Let me begin with a comment on your request. In your call,
you echo David Wheeler and his plea for “a number of spe-
cific problems whose solution would be likely to advance
substantially our knowledge about mathematics education”.
Upon reflection, I cannot but wonder about what I see as
the epistemological underpinnings of this request. These
hidden premises, I’m quite sure, do not represent your own
thinking. They have simply sneaked into the conversation
together with the language that was in general use at the time
David Wheeler was writing (and don’t forget that Wheeler
was paraphrasing an even earlier initiative by another David,
David Hilbert, whose famous list of the 23 “remaining”
problems of mathematics is, for me, an epitome of positivist
thinking). The expressions “solution to the problem” and
“advancing substantially our knowledge” imply, at least
to me, that research problems in mathematics education are
to researchers what insufficiencies of natural conditions are
to farmers: impairments to be identified, diagnosed and
compensated for. According to this metaphor, our knowl-
edge is like an agricultural crop: it systematically grows
and accrues, and the effectiveness of this process depends
on the farmer’s ability to cope with whatever problems or
difficulties nature may have in store for us. But can prob-
lems of mathematics education, like those of the depleted
soil, be treated as residing in reality itself, as opposed to
the proverbial beholder’s eye? Can anybody really believe
that these problems can be solved once and for all, that is,
in such a manner as to simply go away, never to bother the
researcher again?
The vision of mathematics education research that gives rise
to the research-as-farming metaphor would be described by
Bakhtin as monological, one according to which our steadily
advancing knowledge is a collection of stories about the world,
told by the world itself and ventriloquated by the researcher.
My conception of research is different: it is what some writ-
ers, under Bakhtin’s influence, call dialogic or multivocal. You
can also call this approach postmodern, if you wish.
To describe the multivocal or postmodernist project let me
use another metaphor, one that draws on a domain I am
much better acquainted with than farming—the domain of
clothing. I hope you agree that the researcher’s job is to
forge stories that give us a sense of understanding what is
happening around us and may thus help us to go about our
human affairs. These stories, I wish to claim, are to the world
what clothes are to our bodies: they are human made rather
than being a part of the world itself; they are supposed to
“fit” what they are meant to “cover”; and although there is
no “perfect fit”, no ultimate story about the world, it is also
not true that any story goes [1]. Some narratives may not fit
at all, like a dress that is three sizes too small; for other sto-
ries, the “coverage” may seem so accurate that we start
mistaking the “clothes” for the world’s own skin. And, oh
yes, there is another important parallel: our choice of story is
no less a matter of fashion (and, in the background, of our
desired identities!) than is our selection of garments. 
Once the metaphor of research-as-farming has been
replaced with that of research-as-dressing-the-world, our
understanding of the term “research problem” changes.
First, it becomes clear that it is not the world that faces us
with problems, but rather, it is us who accord this latter name
to whatever makes us less than satisfied with the world’s
present attire. And, as is generally known, especially among
women, this latter need, being a matter of personal sensitiv-
ities, values, and tastes, is always debatable. True, we are
all likely to agree that our purpose as a community is to add
to people’s well-being by helping them to become mathe-
matically educated. We thus probably share the conviction
that our choice of problems for research should be guided by
this distant goal. But this is, I suspect, where our agreement
ends. Once we begin “negotiating” specific research ques-
tions supposed to take us to our destination, we are likely to
find out that there is no consensus about what it means to
be mathematically educated or about what counts as a legit-
imate way of furthering one’s mathematical competence. 
Second, even if a certain research problem gains a wide fol-
lowing, it would be naïve to think that its solution may
“advance our knowledge” in any absolute manner or can earn
universal acceptance. Such hope would be as unreasonable as
it is to believe that a single designer collection may ever gain
exclusive control over the entire fashion market. But if not this,
you may wonder, what could be the reward for one’s research
efforts? Is there any other reason for going through the pain
of this complex endeavor than our wish to make academic
careers? For me there is, as there is, I believe, for most of us.
As a dressmaker for the world of mathematics teaching and
learning, I am satisfied if the new dress I have sewn is pleas-
ing to my eye and makes me hope that whoever chooses to
use it feels more comfortable than before; I am fully gratified
if this hope comes true, that is, if some people, and especially
some teachers, actually tell me that they find the new garment
more effective in fulfilling its role than the one in which they
were dressing the world so far; and I am beyond myself with
joy if there is a piece of evidence that the new dress made
somebody, if only a child or two, happier. And no, I am not
deterred by the thought that my offerings, even if successful
now, will one day be deemed “unfashionable”. As a dress-
maker, I can only strive for solutions that are good for now. 
My research problems, just like their solutions, are also
for here and now, at least in the historical perspective. The
list of my present personal favorites includes a number of
long-standing queries that have always obstructed our (my)
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matical thinking. I presented five such problems in my book
Thinking as Communicating, where they were called “quan-
daries”: the quandaries of number, of abstraction (and
“transfer”), of “misconceptions”, of “learning disability”
and of understanding. But I don’t want to repeat myself.
Rather than expanding on any of these old acquaintances
for which, eventually, I managed to find some good-for-now
new clothes. I prefer to talk here about a certain meta-level
problem that had to be tackled before the crafting of the new
“coverage” became possible. Here it is:
Problem for research: how to talk about mathematics
and its learning?
Let me explain. Feeling that my inability to deal with the
quandaries on my list has to do with the way I talk, and so
think, about them, I realized that a revision of my dress-
maker’s tools may be a condition for any further progress. I
began asking: is my present way of talking good enough to
allow me to tell stories as insightful and convincing as I want
them to be? Am I not stymied by assertions I am tacitly
adopting against my own better judgment? Am I not failing
myself and misleading others by saying things I do not intend
to say? Am I not going in circles only because, unwittingly,
I am using the same words in a number of different ways or
because I do not really know what I am talking about?  
You may find it strange that I view all these questions as
constituting a research problem. First, is answering these
questions really a matter of research? Well, I think it is, even
if our own discourse is the object of investigation. Some
people call this kind of enquiry “theory building”. Second,
some may doubt the importance of these questions, saying
that I am just dealing with words, words, words. As you may
guess, my answer is simple: one should not underestimate
words. They are the fabric from which we make our stories
and, as such, they enable and constrain what we are able to
tell. While combining words into assertions about specific
things and situations, we may be informing others, unwit-
tingly, about our entire worldview. My discussion, above,
of David Wheeler’s call aptly illustrates this claim. It also
substantiates my present assertion that thinking about the
way we talk as researchers is a necessary part of our
endeavor. Had I tried to answer David Wheeler’s appeal
without changing the question, I would have entered a dis-
course incommensurable with my own. And I would have
ended up entangled in contradictions. Epistemological
premises hiding in our sentences doom us to failure, just as
Greek soldiers hidden in the wooden horse brought about the
eventual surrender of Troy. In my book, I identified several
linguistic Trojan horses, which, I thought, might have been
responsible for our persistent difficulty with the five quan-
daries on my list. I made the utmost effort to change my
language. Ever since my colleagues and I began working
with these new tools, our “clothing” business has been flour-
ishing and we were able to forge many good-for-now stories
about mathematics and its development [2].
I hope to have answered your question, even if only in an
altered form. Still, I cannot conclude without some foot-
notes, two of them in the form of disclaimers and one of
them a correction to what I said before. This latter footnote
will raise a new question for our collective consideration.  
Footnote 1. My first disclaimer is meant to forestall mis-
interpretations as to my intentions. I hope you do not suspect
me of preaching one discourse for us all. Let me assure you
that I am doing no such thing. While asking “How to talk
about mathematics teaching and learning?” I am not looking
for a newspeak for the mathematics education community.
My recommendation is neither to “advance knowledge” by
adding stories not yet told, nor to limit ourselves to a single
kind of story, created with a single set of tools. All I am
proposing is that we invest as much thought and creativity in
shaping our storytelling tools as we do in the storytelling
itself [3]. What I am trying to say, in short, is this: let us all
be thoughtful and explicit about how our discourses work
and, at the same time, let a thousand discourses bloom. 
But while advocating freedom of discourse, I create, of
course, another problem to be always kept in mind: in the
absence of a common form of talk, how do we communicate
and keep our community together? And this problem forces
me to add the second footnote.
Footnote 2. Freedom of discourse does not doom our con-
versation to failure. I am sanguine about the possibility of
communicating across discourses. I believe that all it takes
to be understood according to my intentions is to be explicit
about how I use words. If I was a non-Euclidean geometri-
cian, I would probably open every story with an explanation
of what the basic word line means in my language (which I
would do by presenting my position on Euclid’s fifth postu-
late). As a researcher in mathematics education, I feel the
urge to explain what I mean while talking about learning.
Footnote 3. What has been said so far obliges me to prob-
lematize my earlier claim that our purpose as a community
is to add to people’s well-being by helping them to become
mathematically educated. Indeed, after issuing the call for the
freedom of discourse I cannot escape the obvious question:
if we are so liberal with regard to our own discourses as
researchers, why are we supporting the idea of imposing
mathematical discourse on everyone? The query seems easy
to answer: mathematics is one of the hegemonic discourses of
our Western society, and thus not being mathematically com-
petent means a serious disadvantage. There is also a simple
explanation for the special allure of mathematical discourse:
with its ability to impose linear order on anything quantifi-
able, this discourse is a perfect setting for decision-making.
No wonder, then, that whatever is stated in mathematical
terms stands a good chance of overriding any alternative
story—enough to recall what counts as decisive “scientific
evidence” in the eyes of the politician. But should the hege-
mony of mathematics go unquestioned? On a closer look,
not each of its uses may be for the good of those whose
well–being and empowerment we have in mind while launch-
ing our research. Thus, for example, when mathematical
discourse, so effective in creating useful stories about the
physical reality around us, is also applied in crafting stories
about children, the results may be less than helpful. More
often than not, the numerical tags these stories accord their
heroes, rather than empowering the student may be raising
barriers that some of the children will never be able to cross.
The same happens when the ability to participate in mathe-
matical discourse is seen as a norm and the lack thereof as
pathology and as a symptom of a general insufficiency of
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the child’s “potential”. “Why should we teach mathematics
and to whom?” is thus, in my opinion, one of the researcher’s
“must-ask” queries. If we want to make sure we do not per-
petuate orders that we would rather like to change, we have
to be always watchful of how mathematical discourse is used.
Notes
[1] “Anything goes” is the slogan which, in the eyes of objectors, encapsu-
lates the postmodernist stance. The critics derive it from the postmodernist
rejection of the idea of “absolute truth”. But “anything goes” does not fol-
low from “no story is true in an absolute manner”, just as the claim that
every dress is equally good for me does not ensue from the fact that there
is no dress that fits me in an “absolute” fashion.  
[2] Some of these stories are offered in the double special issue (volumes 51
and 52) of the Journal for Educational Research titled “Developing math-
ematical discourse—Some insights from communicational research”,
published in March 2012.
[3] Storytelling is not an exclusive activity of researchers—it is something
everybody does. What makes our research storytelling distinct is our being
explicit and meticulous about our tools, and thus also about our assump-
tions. This, of course, makes us more accountable for our narratives than
any lay storyteller




Thank you for drawing my attention to David Wheeler’s col-
lection of problems. It has been fascinating to reconsider
them.
Wheeler did ask for problems “whose solution would be
likely to advance substantially our knowledge of mathemat-
ics education”. As examples I consider the following three,
formulated by Geoffrey Howson, John Mason and Alan
Bishop:
Howson: It would help me to have a better theoret-
ical framework within which to
consider/study/investigate mathematics
education [1]
Mason: Is mathematics really essential? [2]
Bishop: How is mathematical meaning shared?
[3]
These formulations are short and clear. Nevertheless, I have
the feeling that it is impossible to reach any solution to be
generally agreed upon. Howson might have had the same
feeling, as he modified the task by adding: “Here I am for
the moment not asking for a theory, just a framework which
might help to develop one.” But even with such modifica-
tion, his problem appears gigantic.
Naturally, I came to think of David Hilbert’s 23 problems
presented in 1900, which, since then, have provided an on-
going challenge to mathematics research. I looked at a web
page [4] where the problems are nicely classified: some
were solved in a particular year, some are partially solved,
one is too vague in its formulation to be solved, while three
remain unsolved. Progress in mathematics has, at least par-
tially, been related to the resolution of these problems.
Hilbert’s famous second problem was: “Prove that the
axioms of arithmetic are consistent.” Gödel’s second incom-
pleteness theorem, however, showed that no proof of this
consistency can be carried out within arithmetic itself. This
was a most alarming result considering Hilbert’s metamath-
ematical aspirations. When I was young, I spent half a year
studying Gödel’s proof. I was fascinated by the perspec-
tives it provided on mathematics.
While Hilbert’s problems concern mathematics,
Wheeler’s problems concern mathematics education. Lin-
guistically speaking there is not much difference between
“mathematics” and “mathematics education”; epistemically
speaking, there is. The difference becomes clear when we
consider the difference in nature between Hilbert and
Wheeler’s problems. The formulation of Hilbert’s problems
seems be based on some shared conceptions of what a solu-
tion could mean, while what to consider a solution to a
Wheeler problem appears to be ambiguous. 
This brings me to consider the notion of explosive con-
cepts. By this I understand a concept that can be defined
only through concepts just as open and vague as itself. As an
example, one can think of “democracy”. In order to clarify
what democracy means, one may consider the meaning of,
for instance, equity, justice and inclusion. However, these
notions are no easier to define than the notion of democ-
racy.  Thus a definition of an explosive concept does not
“narrow down” its possible meanings. Instead, it opens into
new landscapes of possible meanings.  
Hilbert’s problems are formulated through concepts that
one could call solid, like: integer, real number, axiom, func-
tion, arithmetic, consistency, polynomial, group, algorithm,
prime number, etc. Naturally, the definition, of such con-
cepts are not fixed; they develop during history. What might
be considered a proper definition in one period might appear
inadequate later. Think of the notion of function, for exam-
ple, which has been part of a fascinating conceptual
development.  But, although “function” demonstrates a his-
toricity, it is not explosive. Its definitions and redefinitions
are based on notions generally accepted in the mathemati-
cal community at a given time. In this sense, we can
consider “function” a solid concept. (Let me just add that the
notion of a proof being “finite”, as used by Hilbert in for-
mulating what methods could be allowed in
metamathematics, can hardly be called solid. Let this, then,
indicate that explosions might also occur in mathematics.)  
Contrary to Hilbert’s problems, many of Wheeler’s,
including those presented by Howson, Mason, and Bishop,
are formulated through explosive concepts. In order to
define a “theory” one needs to address broader questions
about knowledge, justification, and power. A discussion of
mathematics being “really essential” leads us to consider the
possible roles of mathematics in society, in technology, and
in people’s life-worlds.  A discussion of “meaning” brings us
into a turbulent trip through the history of philosophy, even
before we come to address “shared meanings”. 
Let us call a problem that is formulated through explo-
sive concepts an explosive problem.  Thus many of the
problems collected and presented by Wheeler are explosive.
Hilbert’s problems, however, can be characterized as being
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solid. They are formulated through solid concepts, and there
exists a general agreement, within the mathematical com-
munity, of whether a particular problem is solved or not.
No such solved/ not-solved duality seems applicable to the
Wheeler problems. 
What to think of this situation? Should mathematics edu-
cation try to formulate its fundamental problems in solid
concepts? My answer is “no”. I find it healthy for mathe-
matics education to grapple with explosive problems. I do
not find it promising to follow the trend that tries to intro-
duce operationalized definitions of educational phenomena,
say, students’ performance and learning gains, and, in this
way, try to deactivate explosive concepts. Instead, it is
important to acknowledge the explosive nature of crucial
problems in mathematics education.
Consider again Howson’s problem, which includes the
notion of theory. Sure, there have been many attempts to
define what a theory is, as well as attempts to try to close
the concept, for instance by defining a theory as an instru-
ment for making predictions. However, I find it much more
productive to acknowledge the explosive nature of “theory”
and explore its relationships to other open concepts. Thus we
can consider relationships between knowledge and power as
well as relationships between theory and power. We can ask:
What interests might a theory in mathematics education
serve? What functions might the school mathematics tradi-
tion, with all its rituals and exercises, serve? In what way
does this tradition accommodate the economic order? Does
mathematics education have a disciplining function, as
implied by Foucault? All such questions can be related to
Howson’s problem of establishing some adequate categories
for investigating mathematics education.
Mason’s problem brings us further: Is mathematics really
essential? This question opens up a range of perspectives. We
could start with the socio-economic order of today and ask
if mathematical knowledge is essential for increasing pro-
ductivity. We could consider if mathematics education serves
a disciplining function, for instance by cultivating what I
call a prescription readiness. Naturally, one could also ask to
what extent mathematics is essential for human dignity and
for human life in general. One could ask if mathematical
rationality is essential for developing and maintaining demo-
cratic institutions in society. One could consider in what
sense mathematics education contributes to the development
of citizenship, and also of critical citizenship. All such issues
whirl us into different open conceptual landscapes.
The same can be said about Bishop’s problem. The very
notion of meaning has a long history in philosophy. Many
different interpretations of “meaning” have been formulated.
And, certainly, no general agreement is in sight. Meaning
has been interpreted in terms of reference, while Wittgen-
stein opened a quite different line of thinking by associating
the meaning of a concept with its use. Discourse theories are
going further by addressing meaning in terms of actions and
power relationships. With respect to mathematics education,
one can consider meaning a relational concept: thus the
meaning of a classroom activity has to do with its relation-
ships to other practices. I have suggested that students’
experiences of meaning have to do with relationships to their
foregrounds. The notion of meaning is explosive—and all
such considerations are only introductory for addressing
Bishop’s concern about “shared meaning”.
It is important to address the issues raised by Howson,
Mason and Bishop. In general, it is important for mathe-
matics education to grapple with explosive problems. 
Let me just say a couple of words about theoretical
progress in mathematics education. Naturally, we immedi-
ately have to recognize that the very notion of progress is
explosive. So when we talk about progress in mathematics
education we cannot be supposed to know what we are talk-
ing about. Let me, however, acknowledge this fact by
suggesting that progress in mathematics education is related
to a readiness to grapple with explosive problems. So, while
progress in mathematics might be related to the solution of
(solid) problems, progress in mathematics education, seen
as a theoretical discipline, can be related to grappling with
explosive problems. This could bring about, for instance, dra-
matic conceptual changes, new discourses, reconstructions of
perspectives, and provocative changes of concerns. This
means that mathematics education should not consider solid
problems, as formulated by Hilbert, to represent any epis-
temic ideal. I see instead the explosive nature of problems in
mathematics education as being a remarkable strength. 
Ah, I almost forgot to say anything about what kind of fun-
damental problems might be relevant to address in
mathematics education, now, almost 30 years after Wheeler
collected his problems. I would need more time to think
about this, but let me just mention some concepts that I, for
the moment, think could be relevant for formulating such
problems: globalisation, ghettoising, inclusion, exclusion,
democracy, citizenship, social justice, equity, democracy,
mathemacy, students’ foregrounds, intentionality, imagina-
tion, hope, dialogue, empowerment, despair, meaning,
action, rationality, discipline, power, capitalism, suppression,
exploitation, colonisation, racism, sexism, interest, critique.
Sure, this list needs to be continued. My point, however,
is not to try to provide an exhaustive list, but to point out the
relevance of explosive concepts in the formulation of impor-
tant problems in mathematics education.  (Naturally, there are
many other non-explosive notions that could be relevant to
use as well like, say, statistics, probability, algebra, land-
scapes of investigation, algorithm. But this is another issue.)
I have written this letter to you enjoying an excellent view
from my flat, 4th floor, here in Rio Claro. It is warm, more
than 30 degrees. I will stop now. Then you can read this let-
ter with a cooler and clearer mind.
PS. Let me just mention that in my book Travelling Through
Education, I address the notion of explosive concepts, and
that prescription readiness is discussed in An Invitation to
Critical Mathematics Education. In another book, In Doubt,
I address the related idea of theoretical uncertainties and
say a bit more about my flat.
Notes
[1] Research Problems in Mathematics Education – I, For the Learning of
Mathematics 4(1), p. 41.
[2] Research Problems in Mathematics Education – III, For the Learning of
Mathematics 4(3), p. 24.
[3] Research Problems in Mathematics Education – II, For the Learning of
Mathematics 4(2), p. 41.
[4] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert’s_problems.
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